Digital ngerprinting is an emerging technology in media security to identify the source of illicit copies and trace traitors. Collusion is a powerful attack, in which a group of attacker collectively mount attacks against digital ngerprinting. In multimedia ngerprinting, there exists complex dynamics between the colluders and the ngerprint detector, who have con icting objectives and in uence each other's performance and decisions. This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework to formulate and analyze the colluderdetector dynamics, in an effort to understand its impact on the traitor tracing performance of multimedia ngerprints. We investigate how colluders adjusts the collusion attacks to minimize their risk under the fairness constraint; and study how the ngerprint detector adapts his/her detection strategy accordingly to improve the collusion resistance, which is shown to be the min-max solution.
INTRODUCTION
Digital ngerprinting is an emerging forensic tool to protect multimedia from unauthorized redistribution and illegal alteration. The " ngerprint" is an unique label that is embedded into every distributed copy to protectively trace the usage of multimedia data. Multi-user collusion is a powerful attack against digital ngerprinting, where a group of attackers work together to undermine the tracing capability. To provide reliable traitor tracing and support multimedia forensics, multimedia ngerprints should resist multi-user collusion as well as single-copy attacks and common signal processing. There has been a lot of work on anti-collusion ngerprint design [1] [2] [3] , where techniques from different disciplines were applied to resist collusion.
In multimedia ngerprinting, the colluders and the ngerprint detector have con icting objectives. The colluders try all their means to remove the identifying ngerprints in their copies; while the ngerprint detector wishes to be able to successfully capture colluders under all circumstances. They in uence each other's performance and decisions, and there exists complex dynamics between the colluders and the ngerprint detector. It's crucial to formulate this dynamics and understand how the colluders and the ngerprint detector interact with and respond to each other. From the traitor tracing perspectively, such investigation helps to have a better understanding of multimedia forensics and improve the collusion resistance.
This paper studies the game-theoretic formulation and analysis of the dynamics between the colluders and the ngerprint detector. We model it as a two-stage, two-person zero-sum game, where the colluders try to minimize their probability of being detected under the constraint that they share the same risk; while the ngerprint detector probes side information of collusion and adjusts the detection strategy to maximize the traitor tracing capability.We also analyze whether there exists such a min-max solution for the colluders, and investigate how to reach the solution.
The rest of the paper is as follows. We begin in Section 2 with the introduction of the system model. Section 3 formulates the dynamics between the colluders and the detector using a game-theoretic framework, and Section 4 analyzes the existence of the min-max solution of this game. We show simulation results in Section 5, and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
SYSTEM MODEL 2.1. Scalable Video Coding
As we move to the digital era and experience the convergence of network, communications and multimedia, scalability in multimedia coding becomes increasingly important for rich media access from anywhere by anyone [4] . It encodes multimedia into several bit streams (or layers) of different priorities: the base layer contains the most important information and must be received by all users; while the enhancement layers re ne the resolution of the receiver's reconstructed copy and have lower priorities. Such an encoding structure provides exible solutions for multimedia transmission and offers adaptivity to heterogeneous networks, varying channel conditions, and diverse computing capability at the receiving terminals.
Following the work in [5] , we consider a temporally scalable video coding system, which encodes different frames in the video sequence in three different layers. De ne F b , F b,e1 and Fe2 as the sets containing indices of the frames that are encoded in the base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2 respectively. F (i) includes the indices of the frames in the copy that user u (i) receives. contains all users who subscribe to the medium-resolution version with the base layer and the enhancement layer 1; and U all contains the indices of the users who receive all three layers.
Scalable Multimedia Fingerprinting Forensic System
Fingerprint Embedding Given a frame Sj in the video sequence, for each user u (i) who subscribes to that frame, the content owners generates a unique ngerprint W (i) j of the same length as Sj, and additively embeds it into the host signal using spread spectrum embedding [6, 7] . The ngerprinted frame is X
where JND is from human visual models to make X (i) j be perceptually the same as the original host frame Sj. We generate independent vectors from Gaussian distribution N (0, σ 2 W ), and then apply GramSchmidt orthogonalization to generate orthogonal ngerprints. Multi-user Collusion Let SC b be the set of the indices of the colluders who receive the base layer only; SC b,e1 contains the indices of the colluders who subscribe to the medium resolution copy; and SC all contains the indices of colluders who receive all three layers.
all is the total number of colluders. Following the two-stage collusion model in [5] , during intragroup collusion, for each frame j ∈ F b in the base layer, collud-
; and for every frame in the video sequence,
Then, colluders apply inter-group collusion: for each frame j ∈ F b in the base layer, the colluded frame is Vj = β1Z 3 . nj is an additive noise to further hinder detection. Fingerprint Detection At the detector's side, the ngerprint detector rst removes the host signal Sj from the test copy Vj and extracts the ngerprint Yj = (Vj − Sj)/JN Dj. Then, for each user, the ngerprint detector measures the similarity between the extracted ngerprint and the originally embedded ngerprint, compares with a threshold h and outputs the estimated colluder set. Performance Criteria The commonly used criteria to evaluate a ngerprinting system's traitor tracing capability are: the probability of catching at least one colluder (P d ), and the probability of accusing at least one innocent user (P fp ).
COLLUDER-DETECTOR BEHAVIOR DYNAMICS
In this "cat-and-mouse" game between the attackers and the digital rights enforcer, colluders adjust the collusion attacks to minimize their chance of being detected under the constraint that they have equal risk; and the ngerprint detector adaptively select the detection strategy to maximize his/her success rate of capturing colluders. Colluder Identi cation with Side Information To improve the detection performance, the work in [8] proposed a method to probe side information and explore unique features of collusion when identifying ngerprints. One candidate of such side information is the mean of the detection statistics that are used to measure the similarity between the extracted ngerprint and the original ones.
Take user i ∈ U all who receives all three layers as an example, to measure the similarity between Y and W (i) , the ngerprint detector calculates
For the simple collective detector in [5] ,
and ngerprints extracted from all frames are used collectively to identify colluders. The ngerprint detector can also examine ngerprints extracted from each individual layer to identify colluders. For example,F (i) = F b if only ngerprints extracted from the base layer are used to decide whether i ∈ SC.
To determine whether user i ∈ U all is a colluder, the ngerprint detector has four choicesF (i) ∈ {F b ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2, F b , Fe1, Fe2}, and thus four different statistics to measure the similarity between Y and W (i) . From the analysis in [8] , the four detection statistics follow Gaussian distribution with the same variance but different means, and the one with the largest mean gives the best traitor tracing performance. Thus, the ngerprint detector should probe information about collusion and adapts its detection strategy accordingly to improve the collusion resistance. The work in [8] proposed a method for the ngerprint detector to estimate these means, and showed that the performance of this self-probing detector is almost the same as that of the optimum detector, who has perfect knowledge of the detection statistics' means and always selects the one with the best detection performance. 
Colluders follow [5] to select the collusion parameters {αj, β l }. The threshold h is selected to satisfy P fp = 10 −3 . The results are based on 10000 simulation runs.
Side information about collusion not only improves the ngerprint detector's performance, it also affects each colluder's probability of being detected and in uences how attackers collude. Take Figure 1 as an example, with the self-probing ngerprint detector, improper selection of the collusion parameters may make some colluders take a much higher risk than the others. Thus, having knowledge of what actions the ngerprint detector might take, colluders have to adjust the collusion attacks accordingly to minimize their risk and ensure the equal risk of all colluders. A Game-Theoretic Framework We use game theory [9] to formulate this complex dynamics between the colluders and the ngerprint detector. This game involves two players, the colluders acting as one single player and the ngerprint detector. They have pure conicting objectives and one player's gain is another's loss. Therefore, we can model this dynamics as a two-stage zero-sum game, where the colluders act rst followed by the ngerprint detector. In our game-theoretic framework, a natural and straightforward de nition of the payoff function is the ngerprint detector's chance of successfully capturing the colluders, or equivalently, the colluders' risk of being detected. We use P (i) s , which is colluder u (i) 's probability of being detected.
Since the self-probing ngerprint detector has almost the same performance as the optimum detector, and this information is assumed to be known by the colluders, the colluders should assume that the ngerprint detector always selects the best detection statistics with the largest mean during collusion. Thus, we can model the dynamics between the colluders and the ngerprint detector as a minmax problem, where the colluders seek the minimum risk under the optimal detector and the fairness constraint, and the detector always has the maximum detection performance:
s.t. max
and
. From the analysis in [8] , P (i) s is determined by the mean of the detection statistics that are used. The larger the mean, the larger the
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value of P (i) s . Therefore, for colluder i1 ∈ SC b , i2 ∈ SC b,e1 and i3 ∈ SC all , (2) can be simpli ed to
In (3), for user i ∈ U all , μ
Similarly, for i ∈ U b,e1 , μ
MIN-MAX SOLUTION
In this section, we'll introduce how to nd the solution to the game under the constraint that all the colluders share the same risk. Given max for each colluder i, then nd all possible collusion parameters that achieve fairness of collusion. Then, to minimize their risk, the colluders select from the feasible set the parameters that give them the minimum risk, and the ngerprint detector uses the detection statistics with the largest mean.
Analysis of μ (i) max
For colluder i ∈ SC b,e1 who receives a medium resolution copy,
c . We can show that
, and (5) can be simpli ed to
The analysis for μ
c are similar and detailed derivation is in [10] .
For colluder i ∈ SC all who receive all three layers, μ
max has four possible values: u
, and u
c . The analysis is similar to (5), and detailed derivation is in [10] . From [10] , if Ne2 > N b , μ (i) b cannot the largest among the four means, and μ
Feasible Set
Given the above analysis, the next step for colluders is to nd all possible sets of {α k , β l } that satisfy μ
and i3 ∈ SC all . Without loss of generality, we consider a scalable ngerprinting system where N b : Ne1 : Ne2 = 1 : 1 : 2. In this scenario, from the analysis in the previous section, for a colluder i2 ∈ SC b,e1 who receives a medium resolution copy, μ
max has three possible values:
. Furthermore, for a colluder i3 ∈ SC all who receives all three layers, μ
e1 . Thus, there are a total of 6 possible combinations of μ (i 2 ) max and μ
The rst one is μ
, and μ
Because the selected β1 and β2 have the constraint 0 ≤ β1, β2
From (6), μ
if and only if
e2 if and only if
In order to be able to select a α1 that satis es both B ≤ α1 ≤ A and 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, it is required that A ≥ 0 (which is always true for all
Combining (8) and (11), we have
satis es (12), colluders can ensure the equal risk by following (7)- (10) when selecting the collusion parameters. In this scenario, μ
and μ
all . The analysis for other combina-
max and μ
max are similar, and the details are in [10] .
Min-Max Solution
After identify all the possible collusion parameters that satisfy μ
, to nd the solution of this colluder-detector game, colluders should nd collusion parameters in the feasible set that gives them the smallest risk, and the ngerprint detector should use the detection statistics with the largest mean.
To demonstrate this process, we use the system setup in Figure 1 as an example, where N b = 5000, Ne1 = 5000 and Ne2 = 10000, respectively. Among a total of K = 250 colluders, if K b = 50, K b,e1 = 25, and K all = 175, for i2 ∈ SC b,e1 and i3 ∈ SC all , there are three scenarios where colluder can have equal risk:
• The colluders can achieve fairness of collusion by selecting β1 = 0.4594, 0.0951 ≤ α1 ≤ 0.2297 and β2 = 0.3248 − α1. In this scenario, μ
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• The second scenario is when colluders select 0.4594
. Among all these feasible sets of collusion parameters, μ
max is minimized when β1 = 0.4594, β2 = 0.2297 and α1 = 0.0951, and μ
• In the third scenario, 0.4594
is minimized and equals to 2.0545 when β1 = 0.4594, β2 = 0.0951 and α1 = 0.2297, which gives μ
. Therefore, the solution for this example is: colluders uses β1 = 0.4594, 0.0951 ≤ α1 ≤ 0.2297 and β2 = 0.3248 − α1, and the ngerprint detector uses ngerprints extracted from all layers collectively to identify colluders. By the above analysis, colluders can't further reduce their risk while still achieving fairness, and the ngerprint detector can't further improve the traitor tracing performance neither. Thus, this solution is optimal for all the players in the game.
SIMULATION RESULTS
We test on the rst 40 frames of sequence "carphone" and choose F b = {1, 5, 9, · · · , }, Fe1 = {3, 7, 11, · · · } and Fe2 = {2, 4, 6, · · · } as an example of temporal scalability. We use human visual model based spread spectrum embedding [7] when embedding ngerprints into the host signal, and assign orthogonal ngerprints to different users. During collusion, colluders apply two-stage collusion in Section 2.2 and follow Section 4 when selecting collusion parameters. For each frame in the colluded copy, we adjust the power of the additive noise such that ||nj|| 2 = ||W (i) j || 2 . We simulate three different types of ngerprint detectors: the simple collective detector in [5] which always uses ngerprints extracted from all layers to identify colluders; a optimum detector which has perfect knowledge of the means of the detection statistics and always selects the one with the best detection performance; and the self-probing detector in [8] which rst probes information about the means of the detection statistics and then selects the detection statistics with the largest estimated mean. Figure 2 (a) shows the performance of different detectors. From Figure 2 (a), using side information about the means of the detection statistics during ngerprint detection help improve the traitor tracing performance, and the performance of the self-probing ngerprint detector is approximately the same as that of the optimum detector. Figure 2 (b) plots each colluder's probability of being detected with the self-probing ngerprint detector. By choosing the collusion parameters as in Section 4, all colluders have the same probability of being detected and achieve fairness of collusion.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the game-theoretic formulation and analysis of the dynamics between the colluders and the ngerprint detector. We model this dynamics as a two-stage zero-sum game, where the colluders select the collusion parameters to minimize their risk under the fairness constraint, and the ngerprint detector probes side information about collusion and adaptively adjust the detection strategy to maximize the collusion resistance. We analyze the existence of the optimal solution where no players in the game can further increase their payoff, and derive the strategy for the colluders and the ngerprint detector to reach if it exists.
